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In 1789 it was possible to speak of a federation of distinct States joined together for their mutual advantage, but today it is rather the Nation that is divided into subnational units. What caused this shift in focus from the States to the Federal Government? Surely the transformation from a collection of thirteen historically separate States clustered along the Atlantic seaboard to a group of fifty States largely carved out of Federal territory has played a role. Building on previous analysis of the economics of federalism, this essay considers the dynamic effects of increasing the number of states on the efficient allocation of government authority between the State and Federal Governments. When the number of States is low, the externalities imposed by state level actions are more limited-and so is the scope of Federal power. When the number increases, however, the scope of efficient Federal power expands because the States face collective action problems. In the second part of this essay, these insights from the economics of federalism are applied to the question of the optimal number of states in a federal system. Having too few states will lead to insufficient cohesion at the federal level, risking secession and ensuring weak government. On the other end of the scale, having too many states encourages the centralization of power. While the optimal number of state in a federal system will ultimately depend on geography, legal culture, and technology, the available data suggest that the ten provinces of Canada may be too few but the fifty of the US may well be too many.
What difference did it make to American federalism and constitutional law between 1791 and 1912 that the United States grew from being a federation of only 13 coequal States to being a federation of 48 coequal States? This essay will attempt to speculate about that important question -a question which has not been systematically 1 George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law and J.D. candidate Northwestern University 2010. We build here on the discussion in Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 761-770 (1995) . ALBERTO ALESINA & ENRICO SPLOARE, THE SIZE OF NATIONS (2005) . See also Steven G. Calabresi, "Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense ANNALS, AAPSS, 574 (Mar. 2001). analyzed so far in the otherwise extensive law review literature on federalism.
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United States federation today with its 50 States has many more member units than it started out with and many more than do other federations around the world. Our thesis in this essay is that this is a very consequential and under-appreciated development.
In comparing federalisms around the world today, we see some federations with a relatively small number of member States or autonomous regional entities like Australia with 6 States, Belgium with 3 autonomous regions, and Canada with a land mass bigger than Americas but with only 10 provinces -a mere 20% of the U.S. DEMOCRACY (1973) . For a static analysis of the optimal number of states in a federal system, see, ALESINA & SPLOARE, supra note 1, ch. 9 (assuming a division of powers between federal and state governments, then determining the optimal number of states). This essay considers the inverse relationship over time: how does the number of states affect the division of powers between federal and state governments?
to about 23% of the whole territory of the United States today, but it is divided among 14
States! Other important additions of territory followed especially as a result of the Mexican War, the Gadsden Purchase, the Alaska Purchase, and the annexation of Hawaii, while some territories held in 1787 like Kentucky, Tennessee, Vermont, and Maine all were admitted as additional individual States in their own right.
Indeed, as early as 1820, only 31 years after the Constitution had gone into effect, the United States had 22 States -almost twice as many as it had started with. From that time on, the only controversy about adding States was about keeping equal the numbers of new slave and free States. By the outbreak of the Civil war in 1861, the Union was up to 34 States and by 1913, when the federal structure of the national government was radically altered by the additions of the 16 th and 17 th amendments authorizing the federal income tax and providing for the direct election of senators, the Union had 48 States.
The critical point is that the Framers concern that Virginia not be too much larger than the other 12 original States led to a national policy of creating numerous new States out of territories rather than a few big ones. It is for this reason that we today have fifty
States rather than say twenty and that is a fact that is very consequential.
This essay will theorize about the likely effects of going from a small number of of States that a federation ought to have if one wants to maintain a balance between national and State power so as to benefit from the economics of federalism.
I. The Number of States and the Case for Augmenting National Power
This section will argue that the United States' move from 13 States at the Founding to 48 by 1913 greatly strengthened the public choice, economics of federalism case for augmenting national power. We will discuss a number of economics of federalism arguments that are commonly made for empowering the Federal Government, and we will show that all of those arguments become more compelling as the number of
States in a federation goes up. We begin with collective action problems and end with problems of pluralism and civil rights.
A. Collective Action Problems

War and Foreign Affairs
The most compelling argument in American history for empowering our national government has been the need to overcome collective action problems. All of Britain's colonies in 1776 faced such a collective action problem when Americans demanded the right to be represented in Parliament if they were going to be taxed and only some parts of the British Imperial Federation were able to band together to secede. Notably, the British North American colonies in Canada chose not to leave the Empire at that point. action problem of providing for a common defense and protecting against civil warfare?
Let's start with the problem of providing for the common defense.
A loose confederacy of a very small number of States -say four -would face very low costs in organizing defense against specific enemies and threats and so it would have less of a need to delegate broad and permanent defense powers to a national or transnational entity than would a confederacy with more member States. As the number of members States goes up from 4 to 13 to 34 and then to 48 the costs of organizing against each specific threat as it arise increase exponentially and the need for a permanent central national or transnational entity increases. 6 It is a lot harder and more expensive to coordinate 48 armies, navies and foreign policies than it is to coordinate 4 or even 13.
Washington found coordinating 13 State militias during the Revolutionary War and its aftermath to be so exasperating that he led in the effort to draft the U.S. Constitution so that future Americans would never face that problem instead. Stamp tax, and a tax on tea on all 13 colonies so they all came to Massachusetts' side.
The colonies in the end overcame the collective action problem of uniting to secede from the British Empire in part because they were so different from Britain and had so much in common with one another.
Another successful secession occurred on January 1, 1993 when the Slovak people dissolved their union with the Czech people even though the differences between the two peoples are vanishingly small. Here again the division of the population into two main groups -Hindus and Moslems in India and Catholics and Protestants in Ireland -greatly lowered the cost of collective secessionist action.
A similarly low cost to collective action has led to serious devolution movements in Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain, and France. Belgium has devolved tremendous power to its Flemish and Walloon communities, and it seems quite possible it will peacefully dissolve as did Czechoslovakia. The United Kingdom recently devolved some South Carolina caved and repealed its ordinance of nullification, but it learned that the next time it wanted to challenge federal power, which turned out to be in 1860, it would need to seek allies from among the other States. In 1832, there were only 24 States in the Union 12 of which were slave States whereas in 1860 there were 34 States in the Union only 15 of which were slave States. The logic of collective action suggests that South
Carolina waited too long to try to organize a secession.
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The Nullification Controversy was foreshadowed in 1798 by the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions whereby the two States -led by Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison -tried to declare that the newly passed federal Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional. The Resolutions claimed the States had formed the Union and that they could interpose themselves against unconstitutional assertions of federal power. Rhode
Island passed a resolution disagreeing and claiming that the federal Constitution was only to be enforced by the federal courts. The controversy was taken to the American people in the election of 1800, and Jefferson was elected President while his allies won control of Congress. As a result, the Alien and Sedition Acts died with Jefferson pardoning those convicted under them.
Our conclusion then is that the case for enhancing federal power over war-making or foreign affairs becomes stronger as the number of member states in a federation increases. We also conclude that the likelihood of a successful secession or civil war decreases sharply as the number of member states in a federation increases. This is especially the case if state boundary lines are drawn arbitrarily as they were in the U.S.
rather than territorially to empower a linguistic, ethnic, or religious subgroups as they were in Canada, the U.S.S.R, or Yugoslavia.
Free Trade
In addition to winning wars and formulating a foreign policy, all countries have a strong national interest in trading with one another. International trade by definition leaves both sides better off, and it increases GDP in both of any two countries that engage in it. Unfortunately, all governments need revenue to function and taxes on international trade are often a politically popular way of raising money because powerful local economic interests may want to be shielded from foreign competition. Even aside from revenue raising tariffs, governments may find themselves besieged with requests from politically powerful local interest to ban certain imports altogether. Without coordinated action, therefore, governments often find themselves with mutual bans on trade that hurt everybody concerned. Overcoming these bans on trade and acquiring access for ones products to foreign markets requires that a government negotiate a free trade treaty with another country or countries. This is a costly and time consuming endeavor.
The 13 European Union is one such structure and GATT may well be becoming another. Again, the greater the number of member States in a federation, the more the need for federal or confederal centralized governmental power.
One would thus expect that as the number of members of a federation increases the amount of regulation of interstate commerce and the scope of the Federal Obviously, a greater number of States will generate a far greater number of externalities.
As it happens, 48 is four times 13 but of course the number of externalities will increase exponentially. It is thus entirely predictable that federal power would grow steadily as about why increasing the number of federal subunits would have been likely to encourage State efforts to get Washington to enable and enforce cartels.
C. Economies of Scale
Another economic argument for national or international power is that as to some activities there are economies of scale that are gained if they are done once by a national or international government rather than 50 times by State governments. We think it is self evident that there are economies of scale for example that are gained by letting the national government create an air force, a space program, and a medical science research program through the National Institutes of Health none of which are authorized as enumerated powers of the national government. This is why Britain, France and Germany chose not to create their own space programs but instead pooled their efforts into a trans-European space program. Less is not always more, and sometimes bigger is better. This is why national grocery market chains have largely replaced corner grocery stores. The advantage of national and international governmental entities is that they can realize economies of scale that the 50 States might not be able to take advantage of.
So how does increasing the number of States from 13 to 34 to 48 affect this economic normative argument in favor of enhanced national power? Imagine here the difference between a United States with four States -the Northeast, the South, the Midwest, and the West -as compared with the current 50 State structure. A federation with 50 subunits rather than 4 will be more likely to experience economies of scale from enhanced national power. A federal subunit consisting of the Northeast or the West might well fund its own stem cell research program, for example, when the State of Massachusetts acting alone would not undertake that. California today has its own global warming and environmental policies, for example, in part because it has about one ninth of the total population of the United States, it is geographically the third largest of the 50
States, and it has an economy that would be the seventh largest in GDP in the world if
California were an independent sovereign nation. Carving the territory of the United States into 50 rather than 4 subunits inevitably means more activities as to which there are economies of scale from doing things federally, and it therefore means a more powerful Federal Government.
In theory, of course the States could negotiate to undertake joint activities and thus to realize economies of scale. To some extent the States do that when with federal permission they create regional airport authorities and other such entities. The problem again is that the bigger the number of federal subunits the higher the cost of collective action. And, the higher the costs of collective action, the greater the incentive to just empower the Federal Government and let it handle the problems in question.
This point, in conjunction with the other points about the escalating costs of collective action as the number of territorial subunits increases, suggests that the prospects for the success of the European Union may be bright indeed. The EU already has 27 member nations and the line of nations wanting to join remains. An EU with 27 member nations will often experience economies of scale by doing things itself rather than leaving them to be done by Germany, France, or the U.K. alone. Moreover, there will be lots of externalities eliminated by EU action, and a diminished ability of any one of the 27 member nation States to threaten credibly to secede or play holdout. The EU is fast approaching the 34 State threshold the U.S. experienced in 1860 when the South discovered that the costs of collective secessionist action had become prohibitively high.
If conservative elements of the Tory Party in the U.K. were to regain control of the Prime Ministers office and of Parliament could they ever withdraw from the EU or nullify an EU policy? We doubt it although it might well be wise for the U.S. to offer the U.K. membership in NAFTA if such a State of events were to occur.
The bottom line is that increasing the number of member subunits in any federation or confederation obviously increases collective action costs thus leading to 
D. Pluralism and Civil Rights
A fourth argument for national and international power has its origins in a debate that went on in 1787 and 1788 during the ratification process for the U.S. Constitution.
Opponents of the Constitution, who called themselves the Anti-Federalists, argued that democracy was only possible in small city States like Athens and Rome before it acquired its empire. The claim was that government had to be kept close to the source of its power (the people) to reduce agency and monitoring costs. Direct popular participation in governments that were larger than city States was obviously not feasible in the 18 th Century given the then available technologies. Moreover, the American Government that he believed would make majority tyranny less likely at the federal level than it had been in the 13 States. The fact majority coalitions are less stable at the federal than at the State level means that consistent tyranny by the same majority of the same minority is less likely at the federal level. Congressional leaders will often be in need of the votes of those sympathetic to minority rights in the future so they will have more of an incentive to treat minorities fairly. The political processes at the federal level are thus less likely to be curtailed by the kind of prejudice which John Hart Ely wrote about in Democracy and Distrust. 25 Indeed, by forcing national congressional leaders to bid for their support, minority groups in Congress may acquire the political leverage of single issue voters.
They may find themselves able to extract political concessions in Congress that they could never have obtained at the State level. The larger number of factions at the federal level and the instability this causes in congressional coalitions thus benefits minorities by making prejudice more costly and less likely at the federal level than at the State level.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
A second feature of the national government that works to protect minority rights involves the large numbers of people who must be brought together in a large democracy to form a popular majority coalition. As Mancur Olson long ago pointed out 26 and as
Madison anticipated, large numbers create a communication problem by making it hard for would-be oppressors "to discover their own strength and to act in unison …." 27 As
Madison foresaw, communication and organizational costs are comparatively lower for discrete and insular minorities than for large amorphous groups. Richard Nixon's famous silent majority was silent because it was expensive to communicate. The very cohesiveness of minorities, their discreteness and insularity, make it more expensive and less likely for majorities to organize than for special interest groups to organize. and ethnic subgroups has many more interests groups than the U.S. did in 1790 and those interest groups will differ more from one another. The formation of permanent majority cartels in Congress thus ought to be harder now than at the Founding and special interests ought correspondingly to be more powerful.
29 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
Of course, the States too have grown in population and several new and very large
States have been admitted to the Union like California, Texas, and Florida. These megaStates, more populous by far than the whole U.S. in 1790, will according to Federalist
Ten be less prone to majority tyranny than say Rhode Island. But compared to the vast Federal Government, even mega-States like California, Texas, and Florida will be easier for majorities to capture and to hold than will be Congress. It is striking in this regard Still, the press and politically active pundits must monitor 50 State governments today for civil rights violations, instead of 13, undoubtedly allows abuses to go unpunished. Moreover, Congress today represents a far greater variety of factions than it did 220 years ago. The Federalist Ten Case for enhanced national power because such power reduces the danger of majority tyranny is thus stronger today than it was at the founding. And, it is stronger in a Union of 34 or 48 or 50 States than it is in a Union of 4 mega-States occupying the same territory and including the same population. The greater the number of States, the more federal civil rights law one might expect to see. Thus, it is no surprise that Congress passed the first civil rights law in 1866 when the Union had 36
States; the Supreme Court began incorporation of the Bill of Rights in 1897 when we had 45 States and finished it once we were up to 48 and then 50; and that Congress, since we have had 50 States has legislated extensively to protect civil rights at the national level.
Even the appearance of federal judicial invention of unenumerated civil rights against the States in Lochner in 1905 and in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965 fits with this picture.
The bottom line is that increasing the number of States from 13 to 50 just by itself makes federal civil rights law more desirable and likely even without factoring in an addition of land and people.
II. The Number of States and the Case for Augmenting State Power
We want here to consider three economics of federalism arguments for augmenting State power in federations: first, that augmenting State power allows a better tailoring of laws to varying tastes, conditions, and preferences; second, that augmenting State power will lead to enhanced competition and experimentation; and third, that augmenting State power will lead to lower monitoring costs. We address each point in turn by relating it to the change we have experienced as a resulting of moving from 13 to 50 States.
A. Varying Tastes, Conditions, and Preferences
A standard pro-State power economic argument is that tastes, preferences, and conditions vary across the States in a federation. Montana has different needs with respect to a speed limit than does New Jersey. Louisiana and Utah have different preferences as to abortion than California or New York. By devolving some power from the national to the sub-national level, constitution writers can hope to maximize social welfare and utility. More people will be happier if there is no national speed limit or abortion policy, and the diverging policies that result may be better tailored to real differences among the State and their peoples. A 55 mile per hour speed limit in Montana may not make sense because of the large size and low population density of that State.
The argument that tastes, conditions, and preferences vary geographically is a powerful argument for State power in the U.S., for Provincial power in Canada, and for real subsidiarity and member nation power in the European Union. How is that argument 
B. Competition or Experimentation Among the States
A second and related economic argument for federalism and State power is that in a federation the member States will compete with each other for taxpayers, for industry, for the highest standard of living, and in providing the optimal governmental bundle of public goods. 30 This competition among States will in turn spur experimentation. States will become laboratories of democracy, as Justice Brandeis argued, competing with one another to offer their voters the optimal bundle of public goods. 31 Thus, federalism not only allows for laws to be tailored to different tastes, conditions, and preferences, but it also sets in place ideally a free market of bundles of public goods. 32 Citizens and business will vote with their feet for the optimal bundle, and States will experiment and compete vigorously with one another as a result.
There are powerful arguments for State power, devolution, and subsidiarity, but how are they affected by increasing the number of States in a federation from 13 to 34 to 48? The answer, we submit, is evident from Antitrust Law which tells us that a free market with 48 players will be more competitive and will lead to more experimentation and innovation than a market with 34 or 13 players. As the number of players goes up, the market share of the largest players will be likely to go down, and the ability of the players to coordinate their activities voluntarily to form a cartel on their own will go down too. the day, and so it can be correctly said that the competition among the States was so successful that it may have helped to lead to the end of American federalism.
C. Lower Monitoring or Agency Costs
Another good economics of federalism policy argument for devolving power to the States is that the people will experience lower costs monitoring their politicians in smaller democracies and that the people will be better able to rein in their elected Since monitoring and agency costs were among the reasons why the U.S. declared its independence from the British Empire in 1776, this conclusion ought certainly to be of interest.
III. What is the Optimal Number of States?
A. This last force for centralization of economic regulation deserves particular consideration. The other forces are discussed above, and all lead to the conclusion that an increase in Federal power as the number of States increased merely maintained an optimal division of powers between the levels of government in our system. They offer the benign explanation for consolidation and expansion of government power. The influence of interest groups offers the malign explanation. It is this, above all, that suggests that having too many States leads to an excessive centralization of government and disrupts the vertical balance of powers in a federal system. The economics of federalism analysis explains why the balancing point has shifted in favor of national power; the interest group analysis suggests there is a thumb on the scales.
As Madison recognized in Federalist 10, an "extended republic" will indeed "break and control the violence of faction" on the State level by introducing countervailing interests.
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However, the transaction costs of organizing majority 39 It is interesting to note the development of the major interstate commerce facilitating actions by the Federal Government. First, the Bank of the United States solved a fundamental problem of financing transactions across great distances. Second, the Interstate Commerce Commission solved a problem of transportation efficiency after the advent of the railroads. Third, the Securities and Exchange Commission solved a problem of information disclosure with respect to investments in an increasingly national market. Fourth, the Federal Communications Commission removed telecommunications from the ICC jurisdiction when such interstate communications became increasingly widespread and complex. 40 This is the down side of experimentation. As the number of States grows, the potential for externalities increases if for no other reason than the proliferation of (potentially externality-generating) policies. Holding the probability of externality generation constant, more policies in force should lead to more externalities, on average. optimal -large enough for cohesion but small enough for true competition between the States. As the number of States increases, the advantage Madison ascribed to the "extended republic" of checking majority factions will begin to tip toward facilitating rent seeking by minority factions. Just as the benign aspects of the economics of federalism suggest the benefit of more States in limiting rent seeking by interest groups, the malign aspects suggest the benefit of fewer.
B. Implications -When Is Enough Too Many?
Our analysis thus far suggests that all the economics of federalism policy arguments both for national and for State power in the U.S. become more telling as the number of States increases. The 50 United States today need a national government more than would a 4 State federation in the same geographical territory because of collective action problems with respect to: 1) war and foreign affairs; 2) free trade; 3) correcting externalities imposed by State action; and 4) reaping the benefits of economies of scale.
The 50 United States also need a national government more today than would a 4 State federation to protect civil rights and guard against tyranny of the majority.
On the other hand, a 50 State federation is more likely to allow for tailoring laws to suit for differences in local tastes conditions, and preferences than would be a 4 State federation. A 50 State federation will also do more to promote vigorous competition and experimentation among its members which will have the negative side effect of increasing demands for federal floor setting or cartelization. Finally, a 50 State federation may benefit from lower monitoring and agency costs.
All of these arguments suggest that when a federation expands from 13 to 34 to 48 States it gets more of both the good and the bad things that come with having a federal as compared to a unitary constitutional structure. Ironically, 50 State competitive federalism may be potentially much better than 25 State competitive federalism, but it is also probably impossible politically to sustain because of the way in which State power is weakened when the number of States expands and because the competition among 50
States with larger numbers of subunits than did American federalism because of the long histories, separate languages, and distinctive subcultures of the EU member States as compared to the 50 American States. At some point that is not that far off, however, the number of subunits will make all efforts to maintain subsidiarity impossible.
Moving beyond the federalism of the European Union, we should note the tremendous spotlight of public attention that President Obama just shined on the G-20 -a group of twenty nations from all over the world that are interconnected economically and are global leaders. For the first time, the G-20 received the kind of media attention normally reserved for meetings of the G-8. The G-8 for the record consists of: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, while 48 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868).
